Robert Lucas published "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique" in 1976. It runs to under 30 pages and contains one idea. That idea reorganised macroeconomics, and fifty years on it still sets the terms on which new ideas enter the field. In many ways it is the foundation stone of the New Keynesian synthesis, the framework central banks and mainstream academics still reason from.
Mark the Graph
I like to plot!
Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Monday, November 16, 2026
nGDP targeting redux
Three questions for the advocates
Stephen Kirchner wrote last week about the Greenspan rule and the RBA, building on a post by Lars Christensen. I could only read the teaser from Kirchner, but the rule is built on nominal GDP targeting: the target is the inflation target plus an assumed trend growth rate. The exchange that followed on X sharpened my earlier view.
nGDP targeting comes in two flavours. Some argue the level of nominal GDP is what should be targeted: set a path, and return to it after any miss. Others argue for the growth rate, and let past misses go. Most academic advocates prefer the level. The Greenspan rule is a growth rule.
Advocates promise that an nGDP target protects jobs better than an inflation target, and that it leaves the central bank with less discretion. They also present it as the simpler regime. So there are three questions. Does it protect jobs? Does it reduce discretion? Is it simpler? I am not convinced.
Friday, November 13, 2026
Mainstream Macroeconomics: A Short History
Mainstream macroeconomics has held three broad consensus positions in the past century. The classical view ruled until the 1930s. The Keynesian view ruled from the 1940s to the 1970s. The New Keynesian synthesis has ruled since the 1990s. Two crises did the damage in between. The Depression and the stagflation of the 1970s each produced facts the reigning consensus said could not happen. This post follows that history.
Wednesday, November 11, 2026
Why I lean New Keynesian
Online I meet a lot of post-Keynesian economists who open with "I don’t believe in a NAIRU". Bill Mitchell has made one of the most sustained cases against it. I remain unconvinced. The NAIRU (u*) rests on two ideas. The first is the Phillips curve: when the labour market is tight, inflation rises. That is easy to show in the data, over time within a country and across countries. I showed it for Australia in The New Keynesian Synthesis, Explained. The second, from Friedman and Phelps, is expectations: wage and price setters build the inflation they expect into their decisions. Put the two together and you get the NAIRU, the unemployment rate at which inflation neither speeds up nor slows down, but settles at what people expect.
Saturday, November 07, 2026
There is no painless way to fight inflation
In this week's Saturday Paper, Paul Bongiorno argues the Reserve Bank has taken an unnecessary risk. He quotes the Australia Institute's chief economist, Greg Jericho, who says there is no data to justify lifting rates to an 18-year high. Jericho's diagnosis is that inflation is "being driven by the cost of fuel, caused by Donald Trump's war in the Middle East, and corporate profits." Bongiorno then offers a way out. "There are other ways to slow inflation, besides what Anthony Albanese now chooses to call 'the blunt instrument' of interest rate rises. It is up to the government to explore and implement them."
Wednesday, November 04, 2026
The NAIRU is structural and slow moving
Previously I argued the government gave the RBA a flawed framework in 2023. Underneath that framework sits a misreading of one key macroeconomic concept: the NAIRU.
Saturday, October 31, 2026
Why the RBA Watches the Quarterly Trimmed Mean
The RBA targets headline CPI inflation. But headline inflation is noisy. One-off price shocks push it around: the GST in 2000, free childcare and the fuel price collapse in 2020. A central bank can't set policy on that noise. It needs a measure of the underlying trend.



