The Federal Budget in Pictures

The Federal Budget papers contain a number of charts, tables and forecasts. The forecasts are the part most people focus on. They are also the part most likely to be misunderstood.

When the Reserve Bank publishes a forecast, it is trying to predict the economy. The Bank looks at the data, consults its models, applies its judgement, and prints a number it thinks is most likely to happen. When the budget papers publish a forecast, they are doing something very different. They start with where the economy is today and assume it returns to something like normal over the medium term. The forecast then asks a simple costing question. Under normal conditions in the out years, what would revenue and expenses look like?

The distinction matters. The budget forecasts are not predictions. They are an arithmetic exercise built on top of an assumed normal economic equilibrium. The numbers that define that equilibrium, things like the medium-term GDP growth rate, the wage and price assumptions, the unemployment anchor, are framework conventions. They are not Treasury's literal central case for the economy. If the equilibrium is wrong, every number that flows from it is wrong too.

This year's papers contain an equilibrium that does not add up.

The reversion always looks the same

Start with real GDP. The black line is what actually happened. The orange lines are successive Treasury forecasts. Almost every forecast bends back toward 2.5 to 3 per cent growth, regardless of where the economy actually is.

A budget about today, dressed in the language of tomorrow

Treasurer Jim Chalmers has now handed down five budgets. All of them, including this one, project deficits. The forward estimates show deficits stretching to 2029-30 and beyond. The budget itself does not return to balance until 2034-35, on Treasury's own modelling. Gross debt crosses \$1 trillion next year and reaches \$1.25 trillion within four years. Interest on that debt is now the second fastest growing expense in the budget, behind only the National Disability Insurance Scheme. At \$30 billion a year, interest alone exceeds the total cost of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.

The Treasurer calls this "responsible fiscal management." The budget is built around a claim of intergenerational fairness. Both descriptions sit awkwardly with the arithmetic, but the deeper problem is simpler. This is a budget about managing the present. It does very little to set the country up for the future: the productivity slump goes largely unaddressed, fiscal resilience continues to erode, and the housing supply problem is treated as a tax problem rather than a supply problem.

Weekly Energy Update

Australian Wholesale Fuel Prices

Finding r-star after the Great Divergence

TL;DR: r-star, the real neutral rate of interest, is one of the unobservable star variables in mainstream macroeconomics. It is notoriously hard to estimate. The Australian IS curve coefficient on the real-rate gap is small relative to macro noise, so the model cannot choose between a growth anchor, a bond-yield anchor, or a blend of the two. Those three approaches, drawing on Wicksell, imply a real r-star between roughly 1.5 and 2.6 per cent, and a nominal neutral cash rate between about 4.0 and 5.1 per cent. With the RBA policy cash rate at 4.35 per cent, policy is not extreme. The data alone does not say whether it is mildly restrictive or mildly accommodative. The post-GFC track record and Governor Bullock’s recent language both lean toward the yield-anchored interpretation, on which 4.35 per cent is mildly restrictive.

Finding r-star after the Great Divergence

After doing additional analytical work that further shaped my views, I have withdrawn my original post. 

Please see the replacement post here.

Weekly Energy Update

 Crude prices/futures

Update on the Iran War: the Mexican Standoff

Where Things Stand

Sixty-one days after Operation Epic Fury began, the war has settled into a structure neither side wants to call by its real name. The shooting has mostly stopped. Nothing else has been resolved.

A two-week ceasefire took effect on 8 April after Pakistani mediation. Trump has since extended it indefinitely. Both sides have accused each other of repeated violations. On 11 and 12 April, US and Iranian officials met face-to-face in Islamabad for twenty-one hours, the highest-level direct talks since 1979. They produced nothing. By 12 April Vance had publicly conceded no agreement. By 13 April the US Navy had imposed its own blockade on Iranian ports. By 18 April Iran had reimposed the Hormuz closure it nominally lifted the previous day.

This is the war now. A dual blockade with no agreed terms, no fixed deadline, and no visible off-ramp. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. The United States controls Iranian ports. Both sides are inflicting sustained economic pain on each other and on third parties who never asked to be involved. US Central Command (CENTCOM) has redirected 38 ships from Iranian ports. Iran has reduced Hormuz traffic to a trickle. The Pentagon has assessed that mine clearance alone could take six months.